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in Jacox v. Jacox, 62 reversed Vanderpool. The court, in a memorandum
opinion, concluded that although CPLR 1102 permitted a court to
assign an attorney to a poor person, there was neither "constitutional
nor statutory authority"6 3 for a court to order a local government to
provide compensated counsel or pay the fee of counsel selected by the
indigent party. The Second Department observed that, absent statutory
authority for ordering compensation of counsel in matrimonial actions,
trial courts must assign members of the bar to provide uncompensated
representation for the indigent.6 4
Given the reluctance of the Second Department to permit the
court-ordered compensation of counsel representing an indigent person
in a matrimonial action, it would appear that the time is appropriate
for the Legislature to authorize such procedure.6 5 Not only would
legislation in this area remove a financial burden from assigned counsel,
but more significantly, such an arrangement would afford an indigent
party in a matrimonial action the opportunity to select his own counsel.
Consequently, reliance upon the court to make such a selection would
be eliminated.
ARTICLE 14 - CONTRIBUTION
CPLR art. 14: New articleenacted to deal with contributionin light of
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.
The Legislature has amended the CPLR to bring it into conformity with the Court of Appeals' decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co." Newly enacted section 140167 allows a claim for contribution beassume the responsibility of paying auxiliary expenses which bar an indigent plaintiff's
access to a court in a matrimonial action. See cases cited in note 57 supra.
62 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.). Consolidated for
appeal in Jacox were three orders of the Supreme Court, Kings County, directing the
City of New York to furnish counsel within a specified time to indigent defendants in
matrimonial actions. The lower court had further directed that if these orders were not
complied with, the defendant in each action could retain counsel. Thereafter, the court
would set the attorneys' fee and direct the city to pay the fee. Id. at 717, 350 N.YS.2d at
430.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 717, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 437. The court in Vanderpool had acknowledged that it
lacked a statutory basis for ordering compensation of counsel. 74 Misc. 2d at 123, 344
N.Y.S.2d at 574.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court, St. Lawrence County, has held that it
would be improvident at the present time to impose the expense of compensated counsel
upon local government in matrimonial actions. Instead, the court suggested that members of the local bar provide their services without compensation. See Bartlett v. Kitchin,
76 Misc. 2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973).
65Justice Shea, in Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc. 2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct.
St. Lawrence County 1973), observed that unless legislative change in this area occurred
soon, court-ordered compensation of counsel for indigent parties may be forthcoming.
66 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
67 N.Y. SEss. LAws [1974], ch. 742, § 1 (McKinney).
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tween two or more individuals subject to liability for the same injury or
damage, regardless of whether the plaintiff has initiated an action or
received a judgment against the defendant from whom contribution is
demanded.6 8 The Legislature, in enacting this section, sought to underscore the fact that Dole and its successors are properly considered as
modifying the contribution doctrine, rather than as overhauling the
law of indemnity. 69
Section 140270 provides that the amount of contribution recoverable by a defendant is that sum paid by him in excess of his equitable
share as apportioned between the defendants at trial.71 Such equitable
shares are determined according to each tortfeasor's relative culpability7 2 It is anticipated that the effect of this section will be to place
the risk of the solvency of the defendants upon the judgment debtor,
instead of the plaintiff.78
Section 140374 states that a claim for contribution may be presented
in a separate action as well as by cross-claim, 7 third-party claim, 76 or
counterclaim. 77 A separate action may prove to be necessary when the
court hearing the primary action is unable to exercise jurisdiction over
the person from whom contribution is sought, or when the primary
action is too far advanced to initiate a cross-claim. 78
Section 140479 contains saving clauses which safeguard the rights of
plaintiffs and defendants. Subdivision (a) provides that nothing in this
68 Id. Previously, a right to contribution only came into existence after a joint judgment had been entered against the defendants. This requirement is now eliminated. See
Tiva.rm ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE CPLR,
as appearing in 2 N.Y. Sass. LAWs [1974] 1809 (McKinney).
69 TwEIVEL ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICmAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE

CPLR, as appearingin 2 N.Y. SEss. LAWS [1974] 1810 (McKinney).
70 N.Y. SEss. LAws [1974], ch. 742, § 1 (McKinney).
71 This has no effect on the rule that the plaintiff's contributory negligence operates
as a complete bar to recovery. If the Legislature adopts a comparative negligence doctrine,
§ 1402 will not have to be amended to reflect such a change. Id. at 1810.
72 The Judicial Conference anticipated that percentages would be used in determining
relative degrees of culpability. Id. at 1811. See also Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31
N.Y.2d 25, 273 N.E.2d 316, 324 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1972).
73 See TWELFrH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON
THE CPLR, as appearing in 2 N.Y. Sass. LAws t1974] 1811-12 (McKinney).
74 N.Y. S ss. LAws [1974], ch. 742, § 1 (McKinney).
7
5 See Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 273 N.E.2d 316, 324 N.Y.S.2d
464 (1972).
76 See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 80 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 831 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
77 See, e.g., Meade v. Roberts, 71 Misc. 2d 120, 335 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. Broome
County 1974).

78There are, however, several disadvantages to allowing a separate action. They
are: (1) additional burden to crowded courts; (2) possibility of inconsistent verdicts; and,
(3) increased difficulty in assessing equitable shares when one of the tortfeasors was not
involved in the original action. See TwELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDIctAL CONFERENCE
TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE CPLR, as appearing in

(McKinney).
7 N.Y. Sass. LAws [1974], ch. 742, § I (McKinney).

2 N.Y. SEss. LAws [1974] 1812
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article will preclude the plaintiff from asserting any other rights related
to the damages claimed at trial.s0 Subdivision (b) contains the same type
of protection concerning the defendants' rights of indemnification and
subrogation.81
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE

CPLR 3101: Defendant-doctor may be compelled by plaintiff to give
expert testimony during an examination before trial.
82
Recently, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, in Kane v. Randt,
held that a plaintiff could compel a defendant-doctor to give expert
testimony during an examination before trial in an action where a
medical standard was in issue, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had shown no inability or lack of intention to call another expert to
testify at trial. In Kane, a malpractice action against two doctors, plaintiffs claimed that defendants had improperly diagnosed a tumor in the
plaintiff-wife's spinal cord as multiple sclerosis. Pursuant to CPLR 3101
(a),8 3 which provides for discovery both before and during trial, the
plaintiffs sought to elicit expert testimony from the defendants during
a pre-trial examination and their request was granted.
Prior to passage of the CPLR, an expert's opinion generally was inadmissible in a pre-trial disclosure proceeding.8 4 However, in 1966, the
Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, in Kennelly v. St. Mary's Hospital,8 5 held that CPLR 3101 allows the admission of an expert's opinion
in an examination before trial where the expert is also the defendant.

The Kennelly holding was based upon McDermott v. Manhattan Eye,
80 This is to assure that article 14 is interpreted consistently with the Court of Appeals
decisions concerning the joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors. 2 N.Y. Ss. LAws
[1974] 1813 (McKinney). Meachem v. New York Cent. R.R., 8 N.Y.2d 293, 169 N.E.2d 913,
206 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1960); Barrett v. Third Ave. Ry., 45 N.Y. 628 (1871).
81 Since Dole is limited to affecting the laws of contribution, this subdivision provides
that in those situations in which the Court of Appeals would apply indemnification or
subrogation, article 14 is not to be interpreted as affecting those rights. See TwELF H
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE CPLR, as
appearing in 2 N.Y. Sss. LAws [1974] 1813 (McKinney).
82 77 Misc. 2d 173, 352 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974).
88 CPLR 3101(a) provides, in part, that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all evidence
material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the
burden of proof, by: (1) a party, or the officer, director, member, agent or employee of
a party ......
84 See Reif v. Gebel, 246 App. Div. 776, 284 N.Y.S. 98 (2d Dep't 1935) (plaintiff
entitled to examine doctor as to the nature of injury for which he treated plaintiff, but
not as to cause of injury since such questioning called for an expert opinion); Bartlett v.
Sanford, 244 App. Div. 722, 278 N.Y.S. 578 (2d Dep't 1935); Pfaudler Permutit, Inc. v.
Stanley Steel Serv. Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 388, 212 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1961);
Murphy v. New York Cent. R.R., 17 Misc. 2d 1026, 188 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1959). See generally 3A WK:M
3101.05.
85 52 Misc. 2d 352, 275 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1966).

